Author: Lawrence Zhou, University of Wyoming & WYVA debate coach The following essay is adapted from a presentation given at the Wyoming High School Forensics Association’s Fall 2021 Conference. Introduction In Part I of this essay series, we covered what the value criterion actually is. In Part II, we will explore three common mistakes often seen in more traditional circuits as it pertains to the value criterion. I strongly suggest that readers begin with Part I as many of the answers to these questions assume familiarity with the concepts in Part I. These common mistakes commonly signal that debaters don’t understand what the role of the value criterion is and can sometimes even hurt debaters strategically in round. This article continues below the fold... Mistake 1: Voting issues
“My first voting issue is the value criterion debate.” I have heard some variation of this line at nearly every local or traditional tournament I have judged at, from preliminary rounds of a novice competition to late outrounds at NSDA Nationals. In fact, I have certainly said something akin to this many times when I was competing in high school. On the one hand, the ubiquitous presence of this line in traditional debates is unsurprising because (A) many debaters have been taught to say this either through osmosis or explicit instruction and (B) it represents an attempt at emphasizing the centrality of the values disagreement in most debate rounds. However, this utterance represents a fundamental misunderstanding about the role of framework (and about argumentation in general). To illustrate the illogical nature of this statement, we begin by breaking down what a “voting issue” is. At its core, a voting issue is any argument a debater wants a judge to vote on. The concept of a voting issue has been expanded (almost certainly unconsciously) to include any argument that the debater wants the judge to remember clearly when making their decision. I find this expansion puzzling since the language of “voting issue” clearly implies that this argument is more than something that is important, but instead something worthy of a label that demands the judge consider it as a sufficient reason to vote for one side over another. There are already a myriad of ways to highlight the importance of arguments to a decision without considering them “voting issues.” By definition, criterions cannot be voting issues. There are two ways to conceptualize why this is the case. The first is just to think about the illogical nature of the statement. You don’t need a robust understanding of debate theory to figure out why the following argument is invalid. Premise 1: All humans have inviolable dignity that stems from their rationality. Premise 2: This suggests that Kant’s conception of morality is correct. Conclusion: Therefore, the United States ought to guarantee universal childcare. Clearly, there are several missing premises. Why does Kant’s moral theory being correct suggest anything about universal childcare? It doesn’t! It’d be equally as valid to argue the following: Premise 1: All humans have inviolable dignity that stems from their rationality. Premise 2: This suggests that Kant’s conception of morality is correct. Conclusion: Therefore, the United States ought not guarantee universal childcare. The above is just as valid. The fact that the same premises can justify totally contradictory conclusions suggests that there is something that has gone awry in the reasoning process. Simply put, winning that a certain set of values ought to take precedence over another set of values does not itself have any bearing on the truth or falsity of the resolution. A voting issue has to relate to a reason why the topic itself is true or false. They must be contention arguments. On the childcare topic, a valid example of a voting issue would be as follows: “My first voting issue is that universal childcare massively increases labor force participation and this is the biggest impact under my criterion of ‘Maximizing expected wellbeing.’” Obviously, this is a clunky example (and I do not recommend that debaters actually speak like this in round), but at least the logic of this statement is not in question. Notice that the criterion explains why this particular contention is relevant to the judge but does not itself constitute a reason why the judge should think that one side has won the debate. The second way to think about why saying criterions are voting issues is incorrect is to think about the different functions of arguments. In debate, there are offensive arguments (reasons why you win or your opponent loses) and defensive arguments (reasons why you don’t lose or why your opponent doesn’t win). Weighing arguments (arguments that compare other arguments) are neither offense nor defense. And recall that the framework is basically just a weighing standard. By definition, only offensive arguments can be voting issues because offensive arguments are the reasons why you win and voting issues are the reasons why you win. If only offensive arguments for why you win can be voting issues, then defense and weighing cannot (by themselves) be voting issues. This may be my biggest pet peeve in more traditional LD rounds. In fact, a line from the most recent version of my Tabroom paradigm (as of writing this piece) is “4. The criterion is not a voting issue. If you say it is, I'll make a big sad face.” Everytime I hear this line, it immediately conveys that the debaters (and/or their coaches) have not thought about debate using simple common sense. While most judges will not immediately pick up on why this line doesn’t make any sense, judges with experience in LD debate will notice this line and this could hurt debaters perceptually. Mistake 2: Criterion texts “My criterion is Locke’s Social Contract.” This statement sounds innocuous enough because it’s a mistake that probably isn’t all that important in the grand scheme of things as there’s no way that making this mistake could cost you strategically in a debate round. However, I think that this is a minor mistake that conveys some information to more experienced judges about a lack of understanding of what the role of framework is which could hurt you perceptually. Recall from Part 1 that most criterions should have a verb at the beginning of them because that tells the judge precisely how to weigh between competing claims. For example, a version of this criterion could be something like “My criterion is ensuring consistency with Locke’s Social Contract.” Here, there is additional clarity for the judge on how to weigh between competing claims: The judge should pick the arguments/contentions that are most consistent with the tenets of Lockean social contract theory. These clear instructions matter because there are some values in which the right way to attain them is unclear. For example, take the value of wellbeing. It’s not obvious whether a criterion of “Wellbeing” really settles much. Does this mean that we should maximize the wellbeing of others? Or does this mean we merely refrain from decreasing the wellbeing of others? This is a simple but obvious ethical dilemma that this criterion gives very little guidance on how to solve. Using the childcare topic, there are some obvious examples where this ambiguity could matter. Say that the affirmative wins that universal childcare is fantastic for increasing labor force participation which increases the wellbeing of society, but that the negative wins that universal childcare imposes some costs on wellbeing to families and children from decreased quality of care. If what we care is about maximizing wellbeing, then the affirmative should probably win. But if what we care about is a moral obligation to avoid decreasing the wellbeing of others, then the negative should probably win. In general, a good criterion text will use words like “respecting, protecting, upholding, maximizing, minimizing, consistency with, preserving, etc.” to provide clear instructions to the judge on how to precisely weigh arguments. Mistake 3: Impact justified frameworks “My criterion is Minimizing Terrorism.” These types of mistakes aren’t as common nowadays but they used to be really prevalent. These types of frameworks are what we call “impact-justified.” The hyperlink is to an old article by Emily Massey that explains in greater detail why these types of frameworks don’t really make much sense. Broadly, there are two reasons why the above example doesn’t make much sense. First, not all terrorism is created equal. Sure, terrorism can be very bad. A worst-case scenario like 9/11 could see catastrophic damage to the economy, thousands of innocent lives lost, and help usher in a series of heavy-handed and counterproductive government policies. There is probably good moral reason to prevent such catastrophes from occurring. Perhaps other threats like nuclear terrorism or bioterrorism warrant more attention. However, most terrorism isn’t nearly that bad. In fact, terrorism is really no more dangerous to the average American than the risk of slipping and dying in a bathtub. Far-right terrorism is likely more dangerous to the average American than Islamist terrorism. Most terror attacks kill only a few and many security experts warn against overblowing the risk of terrorism. Perhaps the government might be justified in infringing on civil liberties if it were necessary to avoid a catastrophic nuclear terror attack. That does not speak to whether the government would be justified in taking the same steps to prevent some lone shooter from carrying out a single attack. These types of criterions are often justified in terms of the worst possible outcomes but that simply doesn’t provide much guidance about what to do when it comes to other impacts that are not nearly as severe. Again, not all terrorism is created equal, so it makes very little sense to treat them as equal. Just because some terrorism is really bad doesn’t mean that we need to prevent all terrorism because not all terrorism is that bad. Second, this arbitrarily excludes relevant impacts. The moral reasoning behind why preventing terrorism matters likely appeals to the consequences of a successful terror attack, e.g. the unnecessary suffering it imposes. But if terrorism is bad mostly because it imposes unnecessary suffering on others, then there’s little reason to think that only terrorism is bad or even that terrorism is the largest cause of unnecessary suffering. Many other things cause unnecessary suffering like poverty or war. What’s the reason for why terrorism matters more than all those other causes of unnecessary suffering? Truthfully, there isn’t one. The problem is that the moral logic for why terrorism is bad (because it causes unnecessary suffering) is the same moral logic for why a wide variety of other bad things are bad (they also cause unnecessary suffering) and there’s no non-arbitrary reason to prioritize terrorism over other causes of unnecessary suffering. In this example, the more apt criterion would be “Minimizing unnecessary suffering.” This gives the relevant moral variable—suffering—the weight it’s due without arbitrarily excluding other impacts. When you’re designing your value criterion, make sure it isn’t impact-justified. In this essay, we’ve covered three common framework mistakes in more local or traditional rounds. These mistakes can not only be strategically costly, but they can give off the perception that debaters don’t know what they’re talking about. Avoiding these mistakes can really help improve the quality of criterion debating. In Part III, we’ll talk about the state of contemporary criterion debate, why I think it could be improved, and ways to improve it.
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